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THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY
By Jeffrey O'Connell. New York: Free Press, 1979.
Pp. xiii, 271. $10.95.
Reviewed by Cornelius J. Peck*
The dustjacket for this already provocatively entitled book continues
with the additional legend: "Only the Lawyers Win-Most people get
nothing. A few get too much. A proposal for reform." This addition to
the title of the book gives appropriate, if not exact, warning that a reader
is about to fall under the influence of a spell-binding author, whose sense
of theatre equals that of the lawyers whose exploits he exposes. It does
not, however, prepare one for his serious analysis, arguments, and proposals concerning how law should distribute the losses of accidental injuries which occur in our society.
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell, now a member of the University of Virginia Law School Faculty (formerly a member of the faculty of the School
of Law of the University of Illinois), is probably best known for his coauthorship of the Keeton and O'Connell no-fault automobile accident reparation plan.' He has presented us with a book on this occasion which
falls into three parts. The first part describes in devastating fashion the
current operation of the tort law system for assigning responsibility for
accidental injuries. He next moves to a description of how no-fault automobile accident reparation plans of various states have performed in recent years. Thereafter, taking a judgment that some no-fault automobile
accident reparation plans have worked well, he moves to a consideration
of how no-fault insurance concepts might be put to use in other contexts.
Professor O'Connell's account of the manner in which disputes concerning liability for accidental injury are now settled in American courts
is fascinating, awe-inspiring, horrifying, and chilling, as well as disgusting. The author must have intended it to be all of that and to trigger strong
emotional reactions to descriptions of the perils, the chicanery, the low
emotional appeals, and the outright fraud which occur in the trial of suits
concerning accidental injury in courts today. An affected reader's concern might well be that some practicing lawyers will read the book, not to
gain the understanding of the irrationality of the process in which they are
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., 1944, Harvard; LL.B., 1949, Harvard.
1. R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICrIM-A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). Professor O'Connell has been a prolific author, and citations to his many writings on no-fault accident reparation plans would result in an impressive, space-
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engaged, but instead to learn how they might more effectively make use
of that irrationality.
For example, O'Connell describes how Philip Corboy, a very successful plaintiff's personal injury lawyer practicing in Chicago, makes constant use of a portable lectern to establish himself as an authority figure.
That same lawyer generally keeps a seriously injured plaintiff out of the
courtroom and the jury's sight to permit the fullest shock of his impaired,
injured condition during a limited time before them. This also prevents
the jury from gaining from more continuous observations any impression
that the plaintiff may have learned to live with his incapacitating injuries.
Defense counsel resort to similar strategems, such as having a lower level
supervisor constantly at counsel's table to suggest that this humble and
very human individual is the one who will be sacrificed if the judgment
goes against his corporate employer. Undoubtedly reprehensible and unethical is the reported gambit of one defense counsel who had his "attractive blond secretary" come into the courtroom in the presence of the jury,
sit next to the widower plaintiff suing for the wrongful death of his wife,
and pat the widower's hand after a short discussion. Eschewing sex discrimination, this same attorney apparently arranged to have an attractive
young man chat with a plaintiff widow who was suing for the wrongful
death of her husband.
The Ford Motor Company takes its lumps in the author's description of
its failure to disclose information concerning the knowledge it had from
tests conducted by its English subsidiary concerning the failure of fuel
tanks in rear-end crashes of its 1966 Fairlane and Mustang models. General Motors comes out no better in an account of its production of records
and documents in such voluminous quantities that the purpose must have
been to frustrate the discovery which the rules of civil procedure contemplate.
The reliance in this country on the jury for resolution of accident litigation is likewise subjected to a devastating criticism. Juries decide cases
without instructions on important matters such as the presence of insurance, the tax consequences of their awards, the effect they should give to
future inflation, or the responsibility for payment of attorneys' fees and
costs. The collateral source rule deprives them of the information that
some losses have been recovered from insurance or other sources. The
instructions given concerning the rules governing liability are framed for
understanding by lawyers, not by lay jurors, or even worse, solely to
filling footnote. Another book of which he is a co-author, J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT
LAW, NO-FAULTAND BEYOND (1976), contains a collection of scholarly writings examining the possibilities of extending the no-fault accident reparation concept to fields other than automobile accidents.
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meet the tests which will be imposed by appellate judges. The juries have
been selected by counsel, not for the purpose of making rational and intelligent decisions, but instead to the extent possible to ensure that they have
biases and prejudices which favor the interests of counsel's client. It is
depressing to contemplate what large incomes can be earned by a sensitive or intuitive judgment about probable biases of persons supposedly
selected for their objectivity and impartiality.
American trial judges come in for similar criticism. Their lives are dull
and dreary, as they preside over a monotonous succession of automobile
accident cases. Competent lawyers may accept appointment to the bench,
but many soon leave, unable to accept the role of observer and umpire to
which our state court judges are so frequently assigned. Most appointments are political rather than merit based decisions. The result is that
judges have less competence than lawyers who practice before them, who
refer to judges as "Your honor" while harboring contemptuous and
derogatory thoughts about their abilities and personalities. For some reason, not fully explained, the author concludes that the English system of
appointment from the ranks of barristers produces a higher level of judicial performance.
The author's comments about the American judiciary come from a general despair and are not criticisms applicable only to the problems of accident litigation. However, that weakness in the judiciary may have a
greater irrational effect in suits for personal injury between insured or
corporate defendants and injured individuals, conceived by an arrogant
judge to be either deserving or non-deserving, than it has in suits on business transactions between parties of relatively equal appeal.
Professor O'Connell finds a similarity between the current adversarial
trial of personal injury cases and the ancient trials by ordeal and combat.
Personal injury lawyers, like professional gladiators, enjoy the combat
and passionately believe they are serving society by championing the
causes of severely injured accident victims. The difficulty of the performance, the risk of loss, and the nobility of their cause provide for them the
justification of the enormous incomes they derive on a contingent fee
basis (incomes of $350,000 or more per year are not unusual). Of course,
the very successful plaintiff's attorneys carefully select those cases which
will produce large judgments or settlements, and leave the others to less
competent attorneys. Those lawyers in turn may make their clients' recoveries even less tolerable because of their ineptness and a willingness to
settle without trial. Substantial referral fees, even though unethical, are
said to be regularly and frequently paid by the successful plaintiff's attorneys to lawyers who performed no legal services. Despite its faults, however, O'Connell believes the adversarial system suits the American char-
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acter. We are not a homogeneous population, but instead a people divided
in ethnic groups, hostile and suspicious, and quite willing to resort to
something like warfare to assert what are conceived to be rights against
others. Change to a more rational system of providing assistance to those
who have been accidentally injured will meet strong opposition.
Professor O'Connell next reviews the attempts which have been made
to replace the adversarial litigation model for dealing with automobile accident losses with a no-fault auto insurance plan. Most of those plans he
deems to be inadequate, either because they are modified no-fault plans
which eliminate only relatively few claims based on fault or because they
are add-on plans, which take away none of the existing tort remedies but
instead provide only additional no-fault benefits. The Michigan law is the
closest to a pure no-fault accident reparation plan, and it receives
O'Connell's approval. 2
The Michigan law now has no limitation on payment of an accident
victim's medical expenses, and provides a maximum of approximately
$53,000 for wage losses. Cost comparisons with insurance under a faultfinding system are difficult to make because only a relatively small, portion of the average motorist's insurance premium is devoted to personal
injury coverage, the bulk of it being devoted to payment for property
damage in collisions, etc. The indications are, however, that Michigan
motorists enjoy the very liberal protection against accident losses at a cost
no greater, and probably less, than the former cost of traditional liability
insurance with a limit of only $20,000. The payments made go to compensate for actual economic losses rather than the ephemeral claims of
pain and suffering of those who receive settlements because of the nuisance value of their claims. 3 Reviewing studies performed by others,
O'Connell credits no-fault plans generally with speeding the payment of
claims and eliminating the need for lawyers' services. Although fifty-five
percent of Michigan residents responding to a poll expressed dissatisfaction with the state's no-fault plan, that dissatisfaction is traced largely to
application of that plan to property damage claims rather than its application to personal injury claims. By a seventy-nine to ten percent margin,
those polled favored curtailing the fault system's right to compensation
for pain and suffering, from which a substantial portion of the liberal

2. For a more detailed survey of the operation of automobile no-fault accident reparation plans,
see O'Connell & Beck, An Update of the Surveys on the Operation ofNo-Fault Auto Laws, 1979 INS.
L.J. 129.
3. For more arguments that recovery of damages for pain and suffering should be limited or
eliminated, see Peck, Compensationfor Pain:A Reappraisalin the Light of New Medical Evidence,
72 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1974).
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medical and economical compensation is financed. The author's conclusion is that no-fault accident reparation plans work better for automobile
personal injury claims than does the existing fault-based system.
But why, Professor O'Connell asks, limit a good idea to but one type
of accident claim? A greater inefficiency of the current tort system's reliance upon proof of fault to obtain compensation can be found in both
products liability and medical malpractice claims. Litigation of a product
liability claim, he argues, is more complicated and more expensive than
litigation of an auto accident claim, so much so that most persons injured
by a defective product never file suit. Nevertheless, premiums for product
liability insurance have been rising at an alarming rate, approaching three
percent of the sales price for some types of industrial machinery. The
medical malpractice crisis has perhaps received even more publicity, and
while premiums have risen to $20,000 a year or more for individual doctors, only 28 cents of a premium dollar goes to compensating injured victims. As with auto accident payments under the fault system, there is no
assurance that products liability and medical malpractice payments are
distributed in any fair proportion for losses actually suffered. The solution, O'Connell suggests, is to adopt and adapt the no-fault systems of
workers' compensation and auto reparation to these categories of losses,
making payment only for economic losses and not for pain and suffering.
A special complication exists for such a proposal with respect to medical malpractice and products liability claims. It is that of determining
what constitutes an injury in the course of medical treatment or what constitutes an injury properly allocable to the manufacture of a product. 4 A
comprehensive social insurance covering all injuries might solve the
problems, but this is viewed unlikely, given the ethnic and class rivalries
existing in the United States. On the other hand, Americans have long
been receptive to market solutions for problems, and O'Connell proposes
that we put the market to use in solving these problems.
This is a proposal that Professor O'Connell earlier explored in a number of law review articles. 5 The idea is not shocking, he suggests, because
4. For a more detailed discussion of the problems, see J. O'CoNNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY
97-101 (1975); Keeton, CompensationforMedical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1973); Havighurst, MedicalAdversity Insurance-HasIts Time Come? 1975 DUn L. J. 1233. A possible solution to the problem of what constitutes a compensable medical injury is a compilation of a list of
compensable medical events. The problem of determining what injuries are properly allocable to the
use of a product is less tractable. See Blum, Book Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 217, 218-23 (1975)
(reviewing J. O'CoNNE.L, ENDING INSULTTO INJURY).
5. See, e.g., O'Connell, Harnessingthe Liability Lottery: Elective First-PartyNo-Fault Insurance Financedby Third-PartyTort Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 693; O'Connell, Supplementing
Workers' CompensationBenefits in Returnfor andAssignment of Third-PartyTort Claims-Without
an Enabling Statute, 56 TEX. L. REV. 537 (1978); O'Connell, TransferringInjured Victims' Tort
Rights to No-Fault Insurers:New "Sole Remedy" Approaches to Cure LiabilityInsuranceIlls, 1977
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it is already used in the form of the contingent fee system in tort litigation
in the United States. In fact an injured victim now sells between one-third
to one-half of his claim to the attorney he retains to represent him under a
contingent fee agreement. The contingent fee system has obtained an uneasy acceptance in the United States, but greater legal barriers exist
against outright assignment of personal injury claims and these O'Connell
6
recognizes must be overcome.
Under O'Connell's proposal, an insurance company would offer an insured no-fault coverage of medical expenses and economic loss for a premium plus assignment of any fault-based claim that the insured might
acquire upon suffering an injury. The insurance company would pursue
the insured's claim against any person liable to the insured, and would
pay the insured the amount of any economic loss in excess of the policy
limits which it recovered from the tortfeasor. The complex questions of
liability for fault and the appropriate damages for pain and suffering
would still have to be settled, but O'Connell optimistically expects that
this would be accomplished much more informally and expeditiously because the settlement negotiations would usually be conducted by the professionals representing two insurance companies. Sale of no-fault insurance would be promoted by labor unions, credit unions, workers'
compensation insurers, and various professional organizations, which
would assure fair treatment of insureds because of the continuing relationship of the insurance company and the promoting agency.
Somewhat inexplicably, Professor O'Connell ends his book with a
chapter in which he expresses his reservations about the insurance industry, the attitudes and abilities of the persons attracted to such work, and
the ability of the industry to respond in a humane manner to demands
made upon it. Possibly this is his hedge against criticism that one is naive
to attempt to enlist the insurance industry in establishing a no-fault reparation system based on market responses. He concludes that whatever the
limitations of the insurance industry, an individual dealing with a company which has insured him is likely to receive better treatment than that
individual would from the legal profession. In an appendix he continues
his reservations with a discussion of the disputes which might arise beU. ILL. L. F. 749; O'Connell, Contractingfor No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering Doctors and
Hospitals, 36 MD. L. REV. 553 (1977); O'Connell, Alternatives to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-FaultInsurancefor Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976); O'Connell, Bargainingfor Waivers of Third-PartyTort Claims: An Answer to ProductsLiability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 435. His most recent exploration of the
problem is O'Connell & Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party Tort
Claims as a Means of FinancingFirst-PartyNo-Fault Insurance, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 55.
6. For O'Connell's most recent analysis of the problem and suggestions of techniques available
to the judiciary for eliminating the barriers to assignment, see O'Connell & Beck, supra note 5.
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tween an insured and a no-fault insurer about how a sum received in settlement from a tortfeasor or its insurer should be allocated to economic
and non-economic loss. His proposed solution to this difficult problem
includes use of arbitration.
A greater weakness in his proposal receives no discussion. The dynamics of the tort settlement process differ from those of the marketplace. A
defendant or a defendant's insurer settles a case not because of conviction
that the sum paid is what is justly due and owing to the accident victim.
The sum is paid because the defendant or defendant's insurer reaches the
conclusion that the chances of the victim receiving substantially more are
so great that, after discounting that possible recovery by the chance of a
defense victory, and adding the costs of litigation, it is prudent to settle at
the prop/osed sum. 7 This judgment turns on appraisals of how good the
various witnesses, particularly the plaintiff, will be, and the appeal of the
injured victim to the sympathies and emotions of the jury. These in turn
will be much affected by how involved the victim is in obtaining compensation for the injuries suffered. An accident victim who has assigned his
claim for pain and suffering to his no-fault insurer will probably not make
a good witness if litigation becomes necessary, and it will not take the
professionals representing insurance companies long to recognize this.
The same is true with respect to other portions of the victim's claims in
which he has no personal interest. The result will probably be that the
market will not operate in the manner contemplated by Professor
O'Connell.
These reservations about his specific proposal for harnessing the market to provide no-fault insurance by no means extend to his masterful
demonstration of the irrationality of the traditional tort system as applied
to the major problems of the accident reparation. Nor are they meant to
challenge his fundamental message that a change must be made and new
solutions found. Experience with no-fault automobile accident reparations has demonstrated that an existing insurance industry can successfully be subjected to fundamental changes in concepts of compensation
and methods of operation which many persons did not believe possible
when Professor O'Connell and his colleague, then Professor, now Judge
Keeton, undertook their pioneering work of promoting the no-fault concept. Professor O'Connell's book will serve well to educate the general
public and alert it to the need for change with respect to reparation for
other accident losses, even if his specific proposal is not adopted.

7. P. HERMANN, BETTER SETILEmEm THROUGH LEVERAGE 9-10, 122-24, 130-32
PECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATIONS 3-5 (2d Ed. 1980).

(1965); C.
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